This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.
Introduction
Literature regarding common property has recently enjoyed significant discussion and debate regarding a new theory known as a "Tragedy of the Anticommons." Many scholars, alert to the myriad problems raised by the fragmentation of property rights, have closely examined what has become termed "anticommons" property regimes (Heller, 1998; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Buchanan and Yoon, 2000; Parisi, 2002; Depoorter and Parisi, 2001; Schulz, Parisi and Depoorter, 2002) . That is to say, when multiple owners, each possessing a right to exclude others from a scarce resource, are prevented from maximizing his privilege of use, the resource may be wasted; this is a problem known as the Tragedy of the Anticommons.
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The economic literature has revealed the duality of commons and anticommons problems. Both problems have been shown to be the consequence of a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights (Schultz, Parisi and Depoorter, 2002) . In situations where multiple individuals are endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, without a cost effective way to monitor and constrain each other's use, the resource is vulnerable to overuse, leading to a problem known as the tragedy of the commons. Symmetrically, when multiple owners hold effective rights to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use, the resource might be prone to underuse, leading to a problem known as the tragedy of the anticommons.
An anticommons property regime occurs when multiple owners of some property hold effective rights of exclusion but insufficient rights to maximize the use of the property, 2 which is an underuse tantamount to waste. Once a common resource is subject to multiple exclusion rights held by two or more individuals, each co-owner has incentives to prevent other users from using the resource at an efficient level. Despite the fact that the common resource would be used to its highest and best use by a single owner, the existence of coowners seeking to exert their individual exclusion rights will cause them to fall short of the net social benefits of the asset. The Tragedy of the Anticommons is the result of common resources remaining idle even when there could be some net social benefit. It occurs simply because the multiple holders of exclusion rights do not fully internalize the cost created by the enforcement of their right to exclude others.
Generally, there are two sources of externalities in an anticommons problem. First, there are static (or current) externalities, in that the exercise of a right of exclusion by one member reduces or eliminates the value of similar rights held by other individuals. One can think of this externality, in price theory terms, as the cross price effect of various exclusion rights. Second, withholding productive resources may create dynamic (or future) externalities because the underuse of productive inputs today bears consequences into the future, as standard growth theory suggests.
Elsewhere, we establish a dual model of property that illustrates that commons and anticommons problems result from opposing but similar departures from a unified conception of property (Schulz, Parisi and Depoorter, 2002) . Consider the traditional structure of a property right held in fee simple as the normal case. In a fee simple regime, owners enjoy a bundle of rights which include, among other things, the right to maximize the use of property and the right to exclude others from it. What characterizes a typical fee simple situation is the fact that the owner exercises his rights of use and exclusion over the same domain. The right to use and the right to exclude are, in this sense, complementary attributes in a unified bundle of property rights.
Exploring the concepts of commons and anticommons regimes requires one to depart from this benchmark conception of unified property. In both commons and anticommons cases the rights of use and exclusion have non-conforming boundaries. They constitute symmetric departures from the unified conception of property. Simply, in commons situations, the right to use significantly exceeds the effective right (or power) to exclude others. Conversely, in anticommons situations, the co-owners' right of use is mitigated, and potentially eliminated, by an eclipsing right of exclusion held by competing co-owners. Thus, one can see in both commons and anticommons cases that rights of use and rights of exclusion have nonconforming boundaries that cause a net welfare loss from the forgone synergies between those complementary features of a coherent, unified property right. Welfare losses are produced by a discrepancy between the rights of use and the rights of exclusion held by the various owners.
The fact that commons and anticommons cases seem to mirror each other results from a misalignment of the private and social incentives of multiple owners in the use of a common
